Russian-Algerian cooperation and the 'gas OPEC': What's in the pipeline? CEPS Policy Brief No. 123, March 2007 by Darbouche, Hakim.
Hakim Darbouche is a PhD Candidate at the University of Liverpool and Visiting Research Fellow at CEPS. 
CEPS Policy Briefs present concise, policy-oriented analyses of topical issues in European affairs, with the aim of interjecting the 
views of CEPS researchers into the policy-making process in a timely fashion. Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed are 
attributable only to the author in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which he is associated. 
 
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (http://www.ceps.eu) y © Hakim Darbouche, 2007 
   
   
   
   
   
   
  No. 123 y March 2007 
   
   
. 123 y February 2007 
 
 
   
   
   
 
resident Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s statement to Spain’s 
El País
1 that the idea of a ‘gas-OPEC’ should not a 
priori be excluded, adds to a series of twists, among 
which was Vladimir Putin’s confirmation on 1 February that 
the idea of a gas cartel was an ‘interesting one’ worth 
considering further. Hitherto, this gas saga featured Russia, 
Algeria, the EU, NATO and Iran. The story revolves around 
Russian-Algerian mingling on gas matters, spurring 
European and Transatlantic concerns over the prospects of a 
‘gas OPEC’. At a time of increasing European dependence 
on foreign energy supplies, these developments have been 
interpreted as being part of a wider effort, led by Russia, to 
use energy as a lever to undermine European diplomacy. 
These allegations have been dismissed by Algeria and 
Russia, whose leaders insist that their cooperation is 
intended to optimise their benefits and those of their 
customers alike. This paper examines the underpinnings of 
these developments by assessing the likelihood of their 
culmination in a gas cartel and offers an insight into the 
potential policy choices behind them.  
Background 
The story dates back to a year ago when, through the 
Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute of 1 January 2006,
2 the 
Europeans realised the extent of their energy dependence on 
a ‘partner’ apparently ready to go to great lengths to restore 
its influence in its own immediate neighbourhood. 
Commentators warned of the potential consequences of this 
situation for an enlarged EU where, on average, new 
Member States import 73% of their annual gas consumption 
from Russia and the figure for the Baltic members and 
Slovakia is 100%. Calls for the need to diversify energy 
                                                 
1 In an interview published on 13 March, the day on which Spain King 
Juan Carlos was to make a 3-day state visit to Algeria. 
2 For details, see Stern, J. 2006. The Russian-Ukrainian Gas Crisis of 
January 2006, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (OIES). Oxford. 
sources and suppliers followed and the EU outlined its plans 
to develop a ‘common and coherent energy policy’.
3  
Following two unstable months which featured sabotage of 
pipelines
4 and strained supplies to Europe due to extreme 
weather conditions in Russia and most of the Continent, 
President Vladimir Putin paid a rare visit to Algeria in early 
March 2006. On the table, officially, was Algeria’s Soviet-
time debt of $4.7 billion, arms deals and other usual 
business. The working formula of the deal provided for part 
of the Algerian debt to be ceded for Russian investment. 
However, the Russians were interested above all in 
Algeria’s state-owned oil company, the ‘untouchable’ 
Sonatrach. Faced with an impasse, the two parties had to 
reconfigure the deal, which left the Russians apparently 
dissatisfied. As a result, Putin’s visit lasted six hours instead 
of the announced two days and Algeria was not invited to 
the St Petersburg G8 summit as part of the traditional 
NEPAD delegation (New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development).
5 Most observers focused on the arms deal, 
which overshadowed an essential element in decoding this 
gas saga, namely Russia’s appetite for Algeria’s strategic 
gas (particularly LNG) assets.   
It was not until early August 2006 that concerns, European 
mostly, were voiced over the possible cartelisation of the 
gas market. These came as a reaction to a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) signed between Gazprom and 
Sonatrach, which between them account for nearly 40% of 
Europe’s gas supplies (26% from Russia and 12% from 
Algeria).
6 It was the discretion and the opacity surrounding 
                                                 
3 EU Commission 2006. A European Strategy for Sustainable, 
Competitive and Secure Energy. COM (2006) 105; EU Commission 
2007. An Energy Policy for Europe. COM (2007) 1. Brussels.  
4 The main pipeline carrying Russian gas to Georgia was blown up on 
the Russian border on 22/01/06, leaving Georgia deprived of gas for 
many days.  
5 Algeria, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa. For details, see 
http://www.nepad.org 
6 These figures apply to the EU-25. The proportions for Western 
Europe are much higher than that.  
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the conclusion of the agreement which sparked this anxiety, 
particularly on the part of the European countries heavily 
dependent on either source, led by Italy which, more than 
anyone else, depends on both (69% of its gas comes from 
Algeria and Russia). Indeed, Romano Prodi was the first to 
react by requesting that the Commission look deeper into 
the matter and seek clarifications from both parties as to the 
content of the agreement. Instead, it was NATO’s economic 
committee which produced a confidential study warning that 
Moscow may be pushing for an OPEC for gas that would 
strengthen its leverage over Europe. Since then, the 
Russian-Algerian rapprochement has been locked into 
Brussels’ radar which picked up further activity in 
January/February 2007: in Algiers, another and arguably 
more substantial MoU was signed between Russian and 
Algerian energy firms; from Tehran, Khamenei openly 
endorsed the idea of a gas OPEC; in Moscow, Putin warmed 
to the idea of a producers’ alliance and promised to ‘think 
about it’; and from Doha where Putin discussed the idea 
with the leaders of one of the world’s top LNG exporters.  
Table 1. Gas statistics for Algeria and Russia, 2005-06 
(in billion cubic meters bcm) 
 Reserves  Production  Exports 
to the EU-25 
Total 
Exports 
Algeria  4,000.58* 88  65  67 
Russia  47,000.83 598  160  202 
* Figure contested by the Algerian authorities. They claim that the real 
figure is 4-5 times higher. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on BP Statistical Review of 
World Energy 2006 and Gazprom in Figures 2005.  
Feasibility of a gas exporters’ alliance 
Although far from novel, the concept of a gas exporters’ 
alliance has attracted much attention in the last year, not 
least because Russia has been the driving force behind its 
recent momentum. Its behaviour in the last 13 months as the 
world’s leading gas producer (27% of world gas reserves 
and 21% of world production) has not inspired confidence 
on the part of the EU, its chief customer. This has been 
exacerbated by Russian moves appearing to extend its 
influence over Europe’s other main suppliers, such as 
Algeria. The Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) is the 
closest materialisation so far of the idea of a gas-OPEC. 
Founded in 2001, the Forum brings together the world’s 
fifteen largest gas producing countries (mainly LNG 
exporters) between them accounting for 73% of global gas 
reserves and 41% of production. Having as its remit the 
promotion of mutual interests and dialogue between 
producers and consumers, the GECF’s weak institutional 
and organisational structures have meant that its activities 
have so far been limited to irregular meetings with no 
consistent attendance, agenda or outcome. On a more 
regional scale, in 2002-03 Russia floated the idea of 
formally organising (CIS) Eurasian exporters, also without 
much success.  
Table 2. Evolution of GECF participation 
 
Note: * indicates observer status; ‘P’ indicates pipeline exporter; ‘L’ indicates LNG exporter.  
Source: Hadi Hallouche, The GECF: Is it really a gas OPEC in the making?, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford, 2006.  Russian-Algerian cooperation and the ‘gas OPEC’: What’s in the pipeline? | 3 
Apart from the weak institutional and organisational 
capacity of the GECF, the feasibility of an eventual control 
of gas export prices and volumes remains slim for a number 
of technical
7 reasons:  
  Unlike oil, gas is predominantly traded on long-term 
contracts, often over 20-25 years with prices indexed to 
oil. This rigidity means that the prospects of an imminent 
cartelisation of the market in an OPEC fashion are 
limited. It is not until there is a movement in the gas 
market towards a spot market system – and that the latter 
is liquid enough – that the scope for a gas OPEC will be 
realistic.  
  The relative cost competitiveness of pipeline-gas means 
that the gas market is regional in nature (Atlantic, Asia 
Pacific and European). There is thus no global gas 
market where exporter actions can be harmonised. LNG 
trading remains relatively small to make a difference.  
  Gas-export infrastructure is capital-intensive which, 
against the background of diverse exporters, would make 
consensus on key issues (such as quotas for instance) 
particularly difficult to achieve. Whilst seeking to 
maximise income from selling gas may be a source of 
unity amongst producers, their varied reserves, 
production and GDP profiles can translate into widely 
diverging strategic objectives.  
  So long as gas prices are relatively high (as they are at 
present) the idea of a cartel remains unattractive for 
exporters.  
The apparent Russian-Algerian alliance in the gas industry, 
for its part, has been met with apprehension from the EU 
whose energy commissioner, Andris Piebalgs, said 
anxiously after January’s agreement between Gazprom and 
Sonatrach, that the two might ‘create a kind of cartel’. It is 
true that potentially these two key players could collude to 
raise gas prices for the European countries. But is it really in 
their short- to medium-term interests, respective and mutual, 
to do so? A closer look at the eventual trade-offs suggests 
perhaps not.  
  The EU is the main consumer market for Russian and 
Algerian gas exports, with 75% of Russian gas destined 
for the EU against 97% for Algeria and will remain so in 
the short-term. Besides, the economic revival of both 
countries and their heavy dependence on the 
hydrocarbon sector for their foreign currency earnings 
(60% in the case of Russia and 95% in Algeria) mean 
that jeopardising their interests in the EU market by 
prompting it to seek alternative sources and/or suppliers 
would be unreasonable. At the turn of the century both 
countries embarked upon major developmental and 
infrastructural projects to compensate for the ‘lost 
decade’ of the 1990s, and foreign currency earnings are 
crucial not only for the realisation of these projects but 
also for their overall macroeconomic stability. In fact, 
following the Ukrainian episode, Algeria’s energy 
minister expressed his country’s apprehension about the 
likely repercussions this experience might have on 
                                                 
7 For a detailed technical insight into the feasibility of a gas OPEC, 
see Hadi Hallouche, The GECF: Is It Really a Gas OPEC in the 
Making?, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford, 2006. 
European energy policy choices and, consequently, on 
Algeria’s lucrative gas business with Europe.  
  The EU is the primary trade partner and source of FDI in 
both countries and as such holds important economic and 
political leverage. 
  Both countries are in the midst of negotiating their 
accession to the WTO and the EU’s consent is necessary 
if they are to secure membership of the Organisation. 
This, besides economic leverage, endows the EU with 
geo-strategic weight.  
  Russia’s decaying pipeline infrastructure and Gazprom’s 
inability to invest in the exploration of new gas fields, 
which may result in a ‘gas deficit’,
8 mean that it remains 
reliant upon foreign, mainly European, investments and 
technology.  
Besides risking compromising their own dependence on the 
EU as a key economic partner, Russian and Algerian wider 
geopolitical interests are far from the level of convergence 
necessary for any collaboration on gas prices to come to 
fruition. In addition to drawing optimal financial and 
economic gains, the two countries are clearly intent on 
capitalising on the current positive energy conjuncture 
(increasing demand and decreasing production in the west, 
high prices and environmental concerns) to restore and 
redefine their respective international and regional 
dominance. Having both recently recovered stability after 
long years of turmoil, albeit of different natures, the elites in 
both Russia and Algeria see their gas potential as the 
principal means at their disposal to project their power and 
influence.
9 On Russia’s part, gas is being used to offset the 
level of EU and US influences in its European 
neighbourhood, which is increasingly looking westward. 
Gas realpolitk seems to be for Russia what the normative 
acquis is for the EU. It is also giving the country the means 
to reassert its role worldwide. Algeria, in its turn, is trying to 
consolidate its position as a key energy partner of the EU by 
investing in new transport infrastructure (new submarine 
pipelines linking Algeria to the EU through Spain and Italy 
– MEDGAZ and GALSI respectively) and downstream 
capacity (new LNG terminals) which will increase its gas 
export capacity to the EU by at least 30 bcm/year at the 
2012/15 horizon. The view in Algiers is that, in addition to 
the fight against terrorism based on expertise acquired in the 
1990s and on economic interdependence, gas can constitute 
one strand of a ‘strategic partnership’ which would govern 
EU-Algerian relations rather than the Neighbourhood Policy 
which is rejected by Algeria.  
Moreover, Sonatrach has in the past concluded agreements 
with companies like Statoil – a Norwegian
10 company with 
relatively important upstream activity in Algeria and a joint-
bidder with Sonatrach in third countries – similar to the 
MoU signed with Gazprom, without resulting in hostile 
ventures or sparking similar concerns. What may be in the 
Moscow-Algiers pipeline then?  
                                                 
8 For details, see A. Riley, The Coming of Russia’s Gas Deficit: 
Consequences and Solutions. CEPS Policy Brief No. 116, Centre for 
European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2006.  
9 In the case of Russia, proponents of this view refer to Putin’s PhD 
thesis in support of their perspective.  
10 Norwegian gas accounts for 11% of EU consumption.   4 | Hakim Darbouche 
Gas export routes to Europe 
 
Source: OECD/IEA, 2006. 
 
Russian and Algerian interests  
Russia’s energy policy towards the EU tends to be perceived 
as a political instrument. Its rapprochement with Algeria can 
be seen through this prism as an attempt to measure the 
extent to which both countries can pursue certain policies 
which do not conform to EU norms without prompting 
confrontation with the EU. This type of behaviour can 
already be seen in Russia’s relations with CIS countries, as 
well as its domestic human rights and democratic deficits, 
which have not been appreciated by the EU. Algeria, for its 
part, besides relying on gas to redefine the framework of its 
relations with the EU, may start flexing its muscle with 
neighbouring rival Morocco as of 2009 when its direct gas 
links to Europe will be operational. Algeria’s recently-
announced move to raise prices for Spain by 20% is already 
being interpreted as a sign of its discontent with Hispano-
Moroccan mingling on the Western Sahara issue.  
Russia and Algeria may be able to capitalise on the current 
sense of vulnerability in EU countries and thwart a common 
European position by prompting rank-breaking in the 
negotiations of gas deals with both suppliers. The purpose 
of this strategy would be to lock in key member states 
(Germany in the case of Russia, Italy and Spain in the case 
of Algeria) that are influential when it comes to EU 
intergovernmental decisions, as is usually the case with its 
foreign policy. There is already movement in that direction 
in the case of Germany with the Northern European Gas 
Pipeline project (Nord Stream). This pipeline will link 
northwest Russia through the Baltic Sea to Greifswald in 
northeast Germany, with an annual capacity in 2010 of 27.5 
bcm capable of reaching 55 bcm in 2013. Concern rose in 
early 2006 (after the setting up of the company and the 
official start of the project) mainly from the eastern member 
states, accusing Gerhard Schroeder’s Germany of myopic 
and selfish behaviour
11 at the expense of the Union’s 
security and diversity of energy supplies. Similar defection 
was also displayed by Italy’s ENI which, after initial outcry 
at Sonatrach’s agreement with Gazprom, concluded a deal 
with the latter providing for long-term (until 2035) 
incremental supply (up to 3 bcm/annum as of 2010). Shortly 
thereafter, ENI sealed a similar deal with Algeria. Spain and 
Portugal followed suit after visits by their respective prime 
ministers to Algeria. The EU, by adopting a common energy 
policy, maintains the capacity to act as a coherent consumer 
group when dealing with both suppliers, but so far this has 
only been seen on paper.   
Through their gas cooperation, Russia and Algeria have 
clear respective objectives in mind. Under the Putin 
administration, Russia’s energy sector has been de facto re-
nationalised as part of a wider strategy to use its huge 
                                                 
11 Schroeder is currently Chair of the Nord Stream board of 
shareholders.  Russian-Algerian cooperation and the ‘gas OPEC’: What’s in the pipeline? | 5 
natural resources as a vehicle to reassert regional and global 
status. Turning Gazprom into the ‘Bear’s claws’ is part of 
the plan. Upon first contact with Sonatrach, the Russian 
authorities eyed a stake in the Algerian company, hoping to 
use a $4.7 billion debt cancellation as a bargaining-chip. 
Behind the offer was hunger for LNG technology and 
expertise
12 and participation in key pipeline projects linking 
Algeria to Europe (GALSI in particular). Sonatrach is an 
important natural gas exporter to southern Europe
13 and, 
owing to LNG, is also reaching traditional Russian 
consumers in Central and Eastern Europe.
14 Gazprom, for 
its part, is trying to penetrate the US and Asian markets 
through LNG supplies to consolidate its global position. The 
second MoU, for instance, signed in January between 
Gazprom and Sonatrach, provides for the exchange of assets 
which can include LNG assets. Algeria is also expanding its 
export capacity to the EU through MEDGAZ and GALSI 
and potentially the Trans-Saharan pipeline
15 which will 
transport Nigerian gas to Europe via Algerian infrastructure. 
This, say Algerian officials, can boost their country’s 
exports of gas to Central and Eastern Europe via Italy. 
Russia would therefore want to get a grip on this potentially 
alternative source and sees rapprochement with Algiers as a 
way of achieving that goal. 
The Algerians have not been passive in the course of these 
developments, for their interests in relation to the energy 
sector are clearly identified and well-entrenched. Prior to 
engaging formally with their Russian counterparts in August 
2006, the Algerian authorities tightened their grip on their 
national energy assets by reversing a controversial 
liberalising law which had been introduced a year before. 
Furthermore, the engagement in cooperation with Moscow 
was undertaken based on awareness of (a) European 
intentions to reduce their dependence on Russian gas and (b) 
Moscow’s plans to increase its influence in the global 
energy market for political ends, starting with Europe. Thus, 
whilst being aware of the price tags attached to the energy 
agreements with Russia and not having clear benefits
16 to 
draw from energy cooperation with Moscow, apart from 
participation in Russian pipeline projects, Algeria is likely 
to have sought something in return in such a venture. One 
element overshadowed by speculations over a gas OPEC 
was a provision in the second MoU for cooperation in the 
field of civil nuclear energy. Algeria has, in recent years, 
been expressing its intentions to rationalise the exploration 
of its hydrocarbon reserves by seeking to use alternative 
sources of energy, notably nuclear and renewable (solar). 
From holding high profile regional conferences on the civil 
use of nuclear energy
17 to raising the subject in official 
discourse, the Algerian authorities have made it clear that 
                                                 
12 Sonatrach is a pioneer in the LNG industry and the second world 
exporter of liquid gas.  
13 Algeria is renowned for the stability of its supplies even in ‘harsh 
times’, as seen in the 1990s when the country was in crisis.  
14 In January 2007, Algeria signed an LNG supply agreement with 
Poland which is trying to diversify its sources of energy. 
15 A pipeline project linking Nigeria through the Sahel region to the 
Algerian pipeline network, allowing for its gas to be exported to 
southern Europe with lower transportation costs.  
16 In cost-benefit terms. 
17 Algeria organised a high level African conference on nuclear energy 
in partnership with the IAEA on 10/11 January 2007.  
access to the use of nuclear energy à des fins civiles was a 
legitimate option.
18 Politically, furthermore, the dividends 
of the deal for Algeria lie in obtaining Russia’s support in 
international fora with regard to the unresolved Western 
Sahara dispute. With the expiry of the Minurso
19 mandate 
looming, Algeria’s anticipation of Morocco’s plans for 
autonomy in the Sahrawi occupied territories is likely to 
have sought a firmer stance from Moscow in relation to the 
problem.  
Concluding remarks 
Russia and Algeria are seeking ways to adapt to the 
changing dynamics of the global energy market. Declining 
reserves worldwide, new emerging markets, environmental 
concerns, renewable sources of energy, geopolitical tensions 
and the ‘Dutch disease’ are all factors on the minds of 
energy policy-makers in both countries. Their cooperation 
in the gas industry, prima facie, appears to be a move aimed 
at coordinating not just their upstream activities but also the 
downstream, including controlling gas prices and volumes. 
Their status as the main suppliers of gas to Europe has 
encouraged these interpretations. Besides technical 
impediments endemic to the gas market, the examination of 
the triadic relationship between Russia-Algeria-EU shows 
that a gas cartel is an unlikely eventuality and that fears of a 
gas OPEC have been exaggerated. Apart from a common 
economic drive to maximise profits from gas sales, Russia 
and Algeria lack a shared geopolitical ground in their 
relations with the EU. The cost of their collusion in cartel-
fashion may therefore exceed the immediate benefits of 
doing so. To focus on one aspect of the MoUs signed 
between Russian and Algerian oil companies, namely the 
commercialisation stipulations, is to omit other important 
provisions which serve the strategic interests of both 
companies in response to a changing energy market. Thus, 
the Russian-Algerian rapprochement has suffered collateral 
damage in the form of gas OPEC fears. 
Not only is the gas OPEC furore surrounding Russian-
Algerian gas cooperation exaggerated, it also is said to have 
been a ‘distraction’
20 from more important developments of 
direct relevance and implications to EU energy policy. By 
focusing on the unreliability of Russian supplies to Europe 
and the recent enthusiastic revival of the gas cartel idea by 
President Putin, most analyses concluded that the EU must 
reduce its dependence on Russian gas by diversifying its 
energy supplies. As a result, a few important elements have 
been overlooked:  
  Middle Eastern gas exporters are increasingly 
considering LNG as an alternative to pipeline gas. This 
is due to the political obstacles to pipeline projects and 
the attractiveness of distant and fast- growing markets in 
                                                 
18 Algeria is already operating two experimental nuclear reactors 
which are in full compliance with IAEA regulations. It has also been 
recently declared by American diplomats in Algiers that an agreement 
with the US on nuclear cooperation was in progress. La Tribune 
10/02/07 (http://www.latribune-online.com )  
19 La Mission des Nation Unies pour un Referendum au Sahara 
Occidental.  
20 J. Stern, Gas-OPEC: A Distraction from Important Issues of 
Russian Gas Supply to Europe, Oxford Energy Comment, Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford, 2007. 6 | Hakim Darbouche 
Asia and the US. High energy prices are also making 
investment in LNG technology more viable.  
  In late 2006, President Putin decided to bring Russian 
domestic gas prices for industrial consumers in line with 
European market prices by 2011. This decision will 
make the growing Russian market as attractive and 
profitable as its European counterpart, especially for 
Gazprom. The result may be less dependence on 
European sales.  
  Central Asian producers are caught between Chinese and 
Indian demand, on the one hand, and lucrative deals with 
Gazprom on the other. Trans-Caspian deals are therefore 
less of a priority.  
The EU energy policy-makers are undoubtedly considering 
a number of variables in their efforts to address the 
challenges of the current energy dynamique. The latest 
communication from the Commission outlining the 
community’s plans for ‘an energy policy for Europe’
21 is 
testimony to such endeavours. A couple of remarks are 
necessary, nonetheless. 
1.  Despite identifying ownership-unbundling in the internal 
market as a prerequisite for an efficient energy policy, 
the Commission does not explicitly tackle the 
problématique of the role of foreign companies in this 
mechanism. The divergent signals sent by national 
governments in relation to this issue can adversely affect 
European efforts for a common energy policy. Besides, a 
coherent unbundling approach can be an insurance 
against eventual price controls.  
2.  When faced with the collective commercial decisions of 
importing countries, such as the EU’s gas liberalisation 
and competition policies, to which they sometimes need 
to conform at the expense of their own preferences, the 
exporting countries should be expected to coordinate 
their policies and actions. 
                                                 
21 EU Commission (2007), op. cit.  About CEPS
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